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Abstract
Drawing on the social intuitionist model, the authors studied the hypothesis that social value orientations are expressed 
automatically in behavior. They compared spontaneous and more deliberated decisions in the dictator game and confirmed 
that social values determine behavior when responses are based on the automatic system. By means of both mediation and 
experimental analyses, the authors further demonstrate that the automatic expression of social value orientations is mediated 
by perceptions of interpersonal closeness. A reasoning process can subsequently override these automatic responses and 
disconnect decisions from perceptions of interpersonal closeness. This results in lower levels of other-regarding behavior, 
at least for prosocials.
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Airline safety instructions recommend passengers, in the case 
of a drop in cabin pressure, to put their own oxygen masks on 
first, before assisting other people. This makes sense, since it 
may take too much time for a helpful person to put a fellow 
passenger’s mask in place, resulting in both losing conscious-
ness. Securing one’s own oxygen intake first allows one to 
assist others afterward. From the perspective of standard eco-
nomic models of behavior, this seems like a strange and 
redundant recommendation. Under the assumption of self-
interest, people should not fail to choose that course of action 
that maximizes personal utility (i.e., survival) in a moment of 
danger, without instructions telling them so. The fact that this 
line is part of the FAA-approved script anyway suggests that 
in some circumstances it may be a spontaneous response to 
help others, even at a personal cost.
Now imagine traveling by subway. As the train approaches 
a station and is about to open its doors, you see a pickpocket 
fish a woman’s wallet out of her purse and walk away. What 
do you do? Do you bother chasing the thief to recover the 
wallet, do you yell to alert the victim and bystanders, or do 
you do nothing at all? Previous research suggests that if you 
intervene, you will most likely do so immediately. After a 
moment of hesitation, the likelihood that you will respond at 
all decreases dramatically (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998). 
This is difficult to reconcile with a rational perspective on 
prosocial behavior. A rational agent’s default decision is 
noncooperation. The decision to help requires a cognitive 
operation in which one considers the potential benefit of 
doing so. Therefore, the likelihood of helping should not 
decrease over time but remain low, or increase.
In this article we propose and test a different model of 
prosocial versus self-interested behavior. We test the idea 
that chronically accessible values to pursue the interest of 
others or the self are expressed automatically in behavior. 
The model we propose is consistent with the observations in 
the above scenarios. According to dual process models, deci-
sions either are based on automatic responses to a situation 
or, if the decision maker has sufficient cognitive resources 
and time at his or her disposal and is sufficiently motivated, 
are based on an additional reasoning process (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996).1 We argue 
that chronically accessible values to pursue the interest of 
others or the self, as captured by the social value orientation 
(SVO) construct, are expressed automatically in behavior. In 
other words, we propose that SVO represents interindividual 
differences in automatic responses in social dilemma situations. 
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We also argue that the spontaneous expression of SVO oper-
ates via perceptions of interpersonal closeness. Some people 
perceive others as close to them and automatically tend to 
take their interest into account. Other people perceive others 
as more distant and, as a result, care for themselves primar-
ily. We suggest that when decisions are based on a reasoning 
process, levels of other-regarding behavior tend to decline, 
compared to decisions based on automatic judgments. The 
decision context we study in this article is one in which there 
is outcome dependence but no outcome interdependence. 
This means that a decision maker influences the outcomes of 
himself or herself and of one or more others involved, but the 
other(s) have no power to influence the outcome of the deci-
sion maker. Both scenarios described above share this char-
acteristic. We study behavior in a dictator game (DG) as a 
simulation of such a context.
Are Social Value Orientations 
Expressed Automatically?
The conception of man as solely driven by self-interest, homo 
economicus (e.g., Luce & Raiffa, 1957), has been challenged 
repeatedly over the past 40 years (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003; Henrich et al., 1991). Most researchers now accept the 
existence of prosocial motives, such as pursuing the interests 
of the collective or seeking equality in resource distributions 
(Mansbridge, 1990; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Van Lange, 
1999). Messick and McClintock (1968; McClintock, 1972) 
proposed the SVO construct to describe individual differ-
ences in the extent to which people take others’ outcomes 
into account when making decisions. SVO refers to a rela-
tively stable preference for a particular pattern of outcome 
distributions between the self and others. Typically, two 
major orientations are distinguished (McClintock, 1972; 
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Prosocials prefer to maxi-
mize joint outcomes and maximize equality in outcomes. 
Proselfs prefer to maximize their personal outcomes either 
absolutely (individualists) or relatively (competitors). SVO 
has been shown to predict levels of cooperation when the 
individual interest is in conflict with the group interest (i.e., 
social dilemmas), such as traveling by public transport ver-
sus taking one’s own car to reduce road congestion (Van Lange, 
Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998), willingness to pursue 
the goals of an organization one belongs to at a personal cost 
(Nauta, De Dreu, & van der Vaart, 2002), willingness to 
sacrifice in close relationships (Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, 
& Steemers, 1997), helping behavior (McClintock & Allison, 
1989), and intentions to behave proenvironmentally (Gärling, 
Fujii, Gärling, & Jakobsson, 2003). However, other studies 
have demonstrated that SVO does not always determine 
behavior and have identified factors that moderate whether 
SVOs are expressed in interpersonal dilemmas, such as 
whether decisions are made by leaders or followers (van Dijk 
& De Cremer, 2006), the strength of situational norms (de 
Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 2006), or whether 
a receiver has the power to punish the allocator (van Dijk, 
De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). As De Cremer and Van 
Lange (2001) have noted, past research has contributed much 
to our understanding of how prosocials and proselfs differ in 
their interpretations of and reactions to others in social 
dilemmas, but relatively little attention has been devoted to 
the motivational mechanisms underlying differences in 
behavior of both groups. One of the goals of this article is to 
improve our understanding of the mechanism by which one’s 
SVO is expressed.
According to the integrative model of SVO (Van Lange, 
1999), prosocials cooperate more than proselfs because they 
value the total group outcome and equality in outcomes. 
Economic models assume that self-interest is a fundamental 
motive in human behavior. This would imply that taking others’ 
outcomes into account requires the execution of some cogni-
tive operation that assesses the benefits of behaving coopera-
tively and a degree of self-control to resist the temptation to 
maximize individual gains. We studied whether this assump-
tion holds or whether for some (i.e., prosocials) choosing to 
achieve a certain level of equality is an automatically expressed 
preference. Specifically, we test our hypothesis that SVOs rep-
resent primary judgments regarding appropriate behavior in 
situations characterized by a conflict of interest.
The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) states that moral 
decisions, like the choice between cooperation and defection, 
are generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations or 
intuitions. These spontaneous responses are shaped by social 
and cultural influences that become internalized during the 
course of personality development. The role of a thinking pro-
cess is largely restricted to formulating post hoc justifications 
for a judgment that is based on one’s feelings about what is 
considered right or wrong. Drawing on the social intuitionist 
model, we suggest that SVOs represent interindividual differ-
ences in spontaneous moral judgments. These are quick, auto-
matic judgments in dilemma situations, triggering a tendency 
either to cooperate (prosocials) or to defect (proselfs). We test 
this hypothesis in Studies 1, 2b, and 3.
Social Value Orientations 
and Interpersonal Closeness
Biologists have suggested that one mechanism through which 
cooperative tendencies have evolved is based on the fact that 
promoting reproductive success of genetically related indi-
viduals benefits the proliferation of shared genes (Hamilton, 
1964). The degree of shared genes cannot be detected directly, 
so organisms have to rely on cues that are associated with 
genetic commonality (Krebs, 1991), such as kinship, friend-
ship, similarity, and familiarity (Cunningham, 1986; Rushton, 
Russell, & Wells, 1984). This suggests that humans tend to 
be more cooperative with those whom they consider to be 
close to them. Work on social discounting supports this idea 
(Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin & Raineri, 1992): People 
are less willing to forgo a fixed amount of money to benefit 
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the other, when social distance between themselves and the 
other increases. In addition, Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson 
(1991) found that people’s decisions in a resource allocation 
task were more fair when their relationship with the interac-
tion partner was closer. In the context of DGs, Burnham 
(2003) found that dictators donate higher amounts when they 
see a photo of the receiver prior to their decision and inter-
preted that “in certain settings, the ability to identify a recipi-
ent (or victim) is an effective proxy for a close relationship” 
(p. 141). Utz (2004) asked participants to indicate which 
goals they pursued when making decisions in a give-some 
dilemma. As expected, she found that prosocials are less 
motivated to maximize their own but more motivated to 
maximize others’ gains than proselfs. Interestingly, by acti-
vating different types of self-construal it was possible to 
temporarily override the goals participants pursue. Participants 
whose interdependent self was activated were less concerned 
with maximizing their own gain and more with their interac-
tion partner’s outcomes than participants whose independent 
self was activated. Insofar as there is a relationship between 
self-construal and perceived social distance, these results 
suggest that perceived interpersonal closeness might be a 
mediator for the effects of SVO, affecting the likelihood that 
decision makers will be concerned about the other person’s 
well-being.
Another line of research suggests that SVO might be 
related to perceived closeness because of its relationship 
with attachment styles (Van Lange, De Bruin, Otten, & 
Joireman, 1997). Prosocials are more likely to have experi-
enced secure attachments with their primary caregivers. 
Those are associated with a greater ease of getting close to 
others. Insecure attachments lead individuals to perceive 
reluctance of others to get close to them (Ainsworth, Blehar, 
Waters, & Wall, 1978).
Based on this evidence we suggest that (a) SVO is related 
to chronic differences in perceived psychological distance 
with others and (b) this perceived psychological distance 
explains why prosocials and proselfs differ in the extent to 
which they take others’ outcomes into account. More spe-
cifically, we suggest that prosocials chronically perceive 
“others” to be closer to them and that this causes higher lev-
els of cooperative behavior, compared to proselfs, at least 
when the decision is spontaneous. In Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 
we test this hypothesis. We do so by means of both mediation 
analyses and experimental design. As far as we are aware, 
we are the first to investigate the relationship between SVO 
and perceived closeness.
Study 1
In a first study, we tested our hypothesis that SVOs are 
expressed automatically in behavior. We observed proso-
cials’ and proselfs’ behavior in a DG and compared auto-
matic decisions, isolated by introducing a cognitive load 
manipulation (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999), to decisions 
made in a situation in which participants had the chance to 
deliberate. When choices are based on automatic judgments, 
we expect more cooperative behavior from prosocials than 
from proselfs. We also have two reasons to expect that dicta-
tors tend to become more selfish when they have the chance 
to deliberate. First, previous research indicates that self-
interested motives are very salient when contemplating a 
decision in a social dilemma situation (Roch, Lane, Samuelson, 
Allison, & Dent, 2000). This implies that dictators are very 
sensitive to justifications that allow them to deviate from the 
distribution proposed by their automatic system and give in 
to self-serving temptations (see also Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 
2008). Second, previous research has shown that in social 
dilemmas, individuals’ behavior is determined by both their 
social values and their expectations about what other people 
would do in a similar situation (Smeesters, Warlop, Van 
Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 
1994). Both the search for justifications and expectations of 
others’ behavior are likely to be affected by what Miller 
(1999) named “the norm of self-interest.” In Western cul-
tures a norm prevails that says that self-interest ought to be 
a powerful determinant of behavior. Dictators might argue 
internally that it is appropriate to comply with this norm or 
might use it as a justification for selfish decisions. Alternatively, 
awareness of this norm may lead players to expect that oth-
ers would behave selfishly in the role of the dictator. When 
they expect selfish behavior of others in a social dilemma, 
prosocials tend to override their initial cooperative inclina-
tion to match that expected behavior (e.g., Kelley & 
Stahelski, 1970). In the current study we verify whether our 
prediction that contemplation results in more selfish behav-
ior is correct. Note that such contemplation requires cogni-
tive elaboration on the decision situation and can occur only 
when the dictator has sufficient cognitive resources at his or 
her disposal. In short, we predict that when prosocials have 
the opportunity to reason, levels of other-regarding behavior 
will be lower than when they are based on the automatic 
system. Proselfs are unlikely to find reasons to increase their 
level of other-regarding behavior when contemplating 
their choice, so we predict that they will act equally self-
interested, regardless of whether they are cognitively dis-
tracted or not.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 160 undergradu-
ate students (64 male, 96 female) who participated in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. The experimental design 
included two between-subjects factors. We measured SVO 
(prosocial vs. proself) and manipulated cognitive distraction 
(distraction vs. no distraction). We measured cooperative 
behavior by counting the number of coins participants allo-
cated to the receiver in a DG.
Procedure and materials. Participants came to the lab in 
groups of eight and were seated individually in front of a 
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computer screen in semiclosed cubicles. After a short intro-
duction to the procedure they were expected to follow in the 
next hour, they completed the DG. Participants learned that 
they were to keep any money they gained from this transac-
tion. They were explained that they would be randomly 
paired with an interaction partner. Although the instructions 
indicated that random drawing would decide which of both 
partners would be the dictator and who would be the receiver, 
all participants were assigned to play the role of dictator. In 
fact, participants were not paired, but all played with a com-
puter program. Before mentioning whether the participants 
would be dictator or receiver and before specifying the 
amount of money they would be playing for, we adminis-
tered the cognitive distraction manipulation. Subsequently, 
participants received five coins of €.20 and were asked to 
decide on the allocation of these resources between them-
selves and their interaction partner. We kept the size of the 
endowment low because prior research has demonstrated 
that dictators’ decisions are relatively insensitive to the 
size of the endowment. What seems to matter are differences 
in relative gains rather than in absolute gains (Carpenter, 
Verhoogen, & Burks, 2005; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
Sefton, 1994). Then, after 25 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, 
they completed the Ring Measure of Social Values.
Cognitive distraction manipulation. Before playing the DG, 
half of the participants were instructed to memorize a ran-
dom seven digit number (5684524); the others remembered 
an easier, structured sequence of seven digits (1234567). The 
number remained on the screen for 8 seconds. Keeping a ran-
dom number active in working memory taxes cognitive 
resources and thereby prevents active contemplation of the 
decision. Memorizing the structured sequence is not effort-
ful, allowing for remaining reasoning capacity. After playing 
the DG, participants were asked to reproduce the number 
they had memorized. The data of one participant who failed 
to reproduce the number correctly were discarded.
Ring Measure of Social Values. We measured SVO using 
the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984). This 
measure contains 24 items, each representing two imaginary 
money distributions between the self and another person. 
Participants were asked for each item to indicate which dis-
tribution they preferred. They were instructed to imagine 
that they played with an anonymous person who received the 
same questions and that individual outcomes were deter-
mined by the choices that both players made. Amounts of 
money can be positive or negative. Distributions are selected 
from a circle in the own–other outcome plane defined by two 
orthogonal dimensions. One represents the outcomes for the 
self and the other represents outcomes for the other. The cen-
ter of the circle coincides with the origin of the outcome 
plane (of which the coordinates are €0 for the self and €0 for 
the other), and its radius is €150. On the circle 24 equidistant 
points are selected. Each point represents a distribution 
between the self and the other. Each item in the measure 
contains two such points, which are located adjacent on the 
circle. An example of an item is a choice between Alterna-
tive A, €130 for the self and €75 for the other, and Alterna-
tive B, €145 for the self and €39 for the other. After making 
the 24 choices, we calculated the total amount of money allo-
cated to the self and the total amount of money allocated to 
the other. These two numbers can be represented as coordi-
nates on the horizontal (own outcomes) and vertical (other’s 
outcomes) axis, defining a single point in the plane. This 
point provides an estimate of the direction of the partici-
pant’s vector in the outcome plane. Each vector reflects a 
unique pattern of choices. Based on their choices, partici-
pants are classified according to their SVO. Participants with 
vectors falling between 22.5° and 112.5° are classified as 
prosocials, and participants with orientation vectors falling 
between 292.5° (or -67.5°) and 22.5° are classified as pro-
selfs. Of 159 participants, there are 80 prosocials, 70 pro-
selfs, 4 are unidentified, and 5 have a low consistency score 
and are also discarded. The SVO of 4 participants (2.52%) 
could not be identified because they had an orientation vec-
tor of exactly 22.5° or because the vector was out of range 
(more than 112.5°). The Ring Measure data also allow calcu-
lating the length of each vector, which is an index for the 
consistency with which the SVO is manifested (Hertel & 
Fiedler, 1998). A maximal consistency score implies that the 
participant’s preferred orientation on the Ring Measure 
remains consistent across all trials (Liebrand, 1984). The 
consistency score is expressed as a percentage representing 
the ratio of the length of a vector, compared to the maximal 
length a vector can have. Usually, only the data of those par-
ticipants with a consistency index higher than 60% are 
retained for analysis (Liebrand, 1984; Smeesters et al., 
2003). Five participants (3.13%) had a consistency score 
lower than 60% and were discarded from further analysis.
Results
Analyses were performed on remaining 150 participants 
(70 prosocials and 80 proselfs). An ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of SVO on the number of coins allocated 
to the receiver, F(1, 146) = 7.92, p < .01. Prosocials (M = 
2.15, SD = 0.96) allocated more to the receiver than proselfs 
(M = 1.68, SD = 1.08). We did not find a main effect of cogni-
tive distraction, F < 1. The main effect of SVO was, however, 
qualified by a significant interaction effect of SVO and cogni-
tive distraction, F(1, 146) = 7.10, p < .01. As expected, we 
found a significant effect of SVO when participants were 
distracted and made automatic decisions, F(1, 146) = 14.52, 
p < .01, with prosocials (M = 2.45, SD = 0.95) allocating more 
coins to the receiver than proselfs (M = 1.53, SD = 0.97). 
When participants were not distracted, we did not observe 
differences between prosocials (M = 1.85, SD = 0.91) and 
proselfs (M = 1.83, SD = 1.20; F < 1). From the other perspec-
tive, when not distracted, prosocials allocated significantly 
fewer coins to the other than in the condition where they were 
cognitively distracted, F(1, 146) = 5.91, p < .01. Donations of 
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proselfs did not differ between the distraction and the no dis-
traction conditions, F(1, 146) = 1.69, p = .20.
Discussion
The results of this study support our hypothesis that SVOs 
are expressed automatically in decisions in the DG. When 
participants were cognitively distracted and based their deci-
sions on automatic judgments, prosocials were more gener-
ous than proselfs. In the condition in which participants had 
the chance to deliberate, however, prosocials seemed to 
override this initial inclination and reduced their level of 
generosity. When they were not distracted, they allocated as 
few coins to the receiver as did proselfs.
Study 2
As we discussed above, we propose that perceived interper-
sonal closeness mediates the automatic expression of SVO 
in behavior. We tested this hypothesis in two parts (Study 2a 
and Study 2b). In Study 2a, we verified whether prosocials 
and proselfs indeed chronically differ regarding how close 
they perceive “other people” to be to them. To that end, we 
measured participants’ SVO and asked them to indicate how 
close they perceived their relationship to be with the interac-
tion partner they had to imagine playing with in the Ring 
Measure. In a second step, we tested the mediation hypoth-
esis itself (Study 2b).
Study 2a
Method
Participants and procedure. Participants were 108 under-
graduate students (59 male, 49 female) who participated in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. They came to the 
lab in groups of 5 to 8 and were seated individually in front 
of a computer screen in semiclosed cubicles. First they com-
pleted the Ring Measure of Social Values and a measure of 
interpersonal closeness. The order of both measures was 
counterbalanced. This took about 10 to 15 minutes, after 
which they continued with other tasks unrelated to this study.
Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale. We measured interper-
sonal closeness using the Inclusion of Other in the Self 
Scale (IOS Scale; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). This is a 
single-item, pictorial measure of closeness. In the IOS 
Scale, respondents select the picture that describes their 
relationship with an interaction partner best, from a set of 
Venn-like diagrams, each representing different degrees of 
overlap of two circles. One circle represents the self (S), and 
the other represents the other person (O). The figures are 
designed so that the degree of overlap progresses linearly, 
creating a seven-step, interval-level scale. The anchors 
are, at one end, two circles that touch each other but do 
not overlap and, at the other end, two circles overlapping 
completely. The order in which the Ring Measure and the 
IOS Scale were administered was counterbalanced. In both 
cases, we first presented the instructions for the Ring Mea-
sure, including the information that participants had to 
imagine playing with an anonymous person who received 
the same items. Then, half the participants completed the 
IOS Scale first, in which case they were asked to describe 
their relation with the person with whom they were about to 
interact. The other half indicated, after completing the Ring 
Measure, how they perceived their relationship with the 
partner with whom they just interacted. We did not find any 
effect of the position of both measures, so it is not consid-
ered in further analyses.
Results and Discussion
Of the 108 participants, 29 (26.85%) could be identified as 
prosocials and 71 (65.74%) could be identified as proselfs. 
Such a skewed distribution is not uncommon (Liebrand & 
McClintock, 1988; Sheldon, Arndt, & Houser-Marko, 
2003). The SVO of 4 participants (3.70%) could not be 
identified because they had an orientation vector of exactly 
22.5° or because the vector was out of range. Data of 4 
additional participants (3.70%) were discarded from fur-
ther analysis because their consistency score was lower 
than 60%.
We conducted an ANOVA to verify whether prosocials 
and proselfs have a different perception of the closeness of 
their relationship with the anonymous interaction partner in 
the Ring Measure. Results indicated this is the case, F(1, 98) = 
18.32, p < .01. Prosocials indicated to feel closer (M = 4.52, 
SD = 1.30) than proselfs (M = 2.99, SD = 1.74). We also 
controlled for gender effects, but did not find a main effect, 
F(1, 95) < 1, or an interaction effect of gender and SVO, 
F(1, 95) < 1. An alternative, continuous measure for SVO 
consists of using the vector angle associated with a partici-
pant’s answer profile in the Ring Measure. Higher numbers 
indicate a larger concern for the payoffs of the interaction 
partner. We calculated the correlation between this vector 
angle and closeness. That correlation was significant, r(100) = 
.48, p < .01, indicating again that perceiving an interaction 
partner as closer to the self is associated with a higher con-
cern for the other’s outcomes. In this study we confirmed 
that SVO is indeed associated with chronic differences 
in perceived interpersonal closeness with an anonymous 
interaction partner. Prosocials perceive the social distance 
between themselves and unknown others as smaller than 
proselfs.
Study 2b
The goal of this study was twofold. First, we expected to 
replicate the findings of Study 1, and second, we tested our 
hypothesis that the automatic expression of SVOs is medi-
ated by perceived interpersonal closeness. To do so, we ran 
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Figure 1. The relationship between social value orientation and 
perceived interpersonal closeness (Study 2b)
Figure 2. The effect of social value orientation and distraction on 
decision making in the dictator game (Study 2b)
a design that was identical to Study 1 and included a mea-
sure for perceived interpersonal closeness.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 109 undergradu-
ate students (36 male, 73 female) who participated in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. The experimental design 
was identical to that of Study 1. This time we also measured 
interpersonal closeness, using the IOS Scale.
Procedure and materials. Participants came to the lab in 
groups of eight and were seated individually in front of a 
computer screen in semiclosed cubicles. After a short intro-
duction to the procedure they were expected to follow in the 
next hour, they completed the DG. The only difference 
between this game and the one in Study 1 is that participants 
now received 11 coins of €.10 instead of 5 coins of €.20 to 
increase potential variance in behavior. The manipulation of 
cognitive distraction was identical to the one in Study 1. 
After choosing the number of coins allocated to the receiver, 
participants were asked to indicate how close they perceived 
their relationship with the receiver to be, using the IOS Scale. 
After 25 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, respondents com-
pleted the Ring Measure of Social Values.
Results
Of the 109 participants, 36 could be identified as prosocial 
(33.03%) and 73 as proself (66.97%). Data of 5 participants 
(4.59%) were discarded from further analysis because their 
consistency score was lower than 60%, and data of 2 addi-
tional participants were discarded for failing to reproduce 
the correct number they were asked to memorize (1.83%). 
This way, 102 observations (34 prosocial, 68 proself) 
remained for further analysis.
Gender was not related to perceived closeness, F(1, 100) = 
1.19, p = .28. Replicating Study 2a, an ANOVA revealed 
that SVO was related to perceived interpersonal closeness, 
F(1, 98) = 23.99, p < .01 (see Figure 1). Prosocials indicated 
feeling closer to the unknown interaction partner (M = 5.47, 
SD = 1.26) than did proselfs (M = 3.88, SD = 1.72). There 
was no main effect of distraction on perceived closeness, 
F(1, 98) = 1.88, p = .17, and the interaction effect of SVO 
and distraction was not significant either, F(1, 98) = 1.40, 
p = .24. Furthermore, we replicated the interaction effect of 
Study 1, F(1, 98) = 5.50, p < .02 (see Figure 2). When dis-
tracted, prosocials (M = 5.50, SD = 0.89) allocated more 
coins to the receiver than proselfs (M = 3.56, SD = 2.87), 
F(1, 98) = 6.88, p < .01. In the no distraction condition, we 
did not find a difference between prosocials (M = 3.78, SD = 
2.21) and proselfs (M = 4.22, SD = 2.51; F < 1). Prosocials 
allocated fewer coins to the receiver when they were not dis-
tracted, compared to the distraction condition, F(1, 98) = 
4.31, p < .04. Donations of proselfs did not differ between 
distraction conditions, F(1, 98) = 1.27, p = .26. There were 
no main effects of SVO, F(1, 98) = 2.16, p = .15, nor of dis-
traction, F(1, 98) = 1.09, p = .30.
To verify our hypothesis that interpersonal closeness 
mediates the effect of SVO on donations in the distraction 
condition but not in the no distraction condition, we used a 
bootstrapping procedure developed by Preacher, Rucker, 
and Hayes (2005).2 The ordinary least squares regression 
model indicated that SVO (with 0 for prosocials and 1 for 
proselfs) was related to interpersonal closeness, t(100) = -4.77, 
p < .01. The interaction effect of closeness and distraction on 
number of coins allocated to the receiver was significant, 
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t(97) = -3.22, p < .01. In the distraction condition, the boot-
strapped estimate of the indirect effect of SVO on number of 
coins donated, via interpersonal closeness, was significant 
(Z = -2.90, p < .01). The correlation between perceived 
interpersonal closeness and number of coins donated was 
significant as well, r(48) = .54, p < .01. In the no distraction 
condition, the indirect effect was not significant (Z = 0.45, 
p = .66). In this case, perceived interpersonal closeness 
was not related to the number of coins donated, r(54) = -.06, 
p = .65.
Discussion
We provided support for our hypothesis that the automatic 
expression of SVO is at least partly the result of a differ-
ential perception of the closeness of one’s relationship 
with an anonymous interaction partner. When we pro-
voked automatic decisions in the interdependence situation 
by imposing a cognitive distraction, participants expressed 
their SVO. The effect was mediated by the perceived inter-
personal closeness. However, when dictators had the 
chance to contemplate their decision, prosocials behaved 
less generously than when deciding automatically and 
behaved similar to proselfs. In this condition perceived 
closeness was not related to the number of coins passed 
through.
Study 3
In this study we wanted to provide additional evidence for 
our hypothesis that perceived interpersonal closeness influ-
ences donation behavior in the DG, but only when the 
decision is based on an automatic judgment (i.e., when 
distracted). In Study 2b we measured SVO and showed that 
its influence on decision making is mediated by perceived 
interpersonal closeness, at least when choices are not delib-
erated. However, it remains possible that perceived inter-
personal closeness is only a proxy for the process that links 
SVO to donation behavior (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005). To further corroborate the causal role of closeness, 
we manipulated it. We did so by identifying the receiver in 
a DG as a person who was either similar or dissimilar to the 
dictator with respect to the daily activities he or she 
engages in. We expect participants to feel closer to people 
who have a similar lifestyle. Furthermore, we predict that 
manipulated interpersonal closeness should influence 
donation amounts only when the possibility of deliberating 
is constrained and choices are made automatically. If par-
ticipants have the chance to deliberate, we expect those 
who feel close to the receiver to cooperate less, compared 
to when they make automatic decisions. Therefore, we 
predict an interaction effect between manipulated close-
ness and cognitive distraction, analogous to the interac-
tion effects between SVO and cognitive distraction in 
Studies 1 and 2b.
Method
Participants and design. The participants were 171 under-
graduate students (44 male, 127 female). They were paid €6 
for participating for 1 hour in a series of studies. The experi-
mental design included two between-subjects factors: per-
ceived interpersonal closeness (distant vs. close) and cognitive 
distraction (distraction vs. no distraction).
Procedure and materials. Participants came to the lab in 
groups of eight and were seated individually in front of a 
computer screen in semiclosed cubicles. After a short intro-
duction, they completed a 15-item questionnaire. Items 
probed how often participants engaged in certain leisure and 
other activities, such as how often they watch the news, go to 
the movies, go shopping, buy CDs, and engage in sports and 
how much they spend monthly using their cell phone. After 
15 minutes of filler tasks, participants played a DG. Instruc-
tions were mostly identical to the ones used in Study 2b, 
apart from the identification of the interaction partner. 
Instead of being explained that they would play with a ran-
domly chosen participant in the same session, they learned 
that they would play with that participant whose answers on 
the 15-item questionnaire resembled their own response pro-
file most (close condition) or least (distant condition). Cog-
nitive distraction was manipulated in the same way as in 
previous studies. All participants correctly reproduced the 
number they were asked to memorize.
Results
We conducted a 2 (closeness) by 2 (cognitive distraction) 
ANOVA on the number of coins donated to the receiver. We 
found a main effect of the closeness manipulation (M
close
 = 
4.49, SD = 1.77, M
distant
 = 3.90, SD = 1.74), F(1, 167) = 6.78, 
p < .01, but not of cognitive distraction, F(1, 167) = 2.67, 
p = .10. This main effect was qualified by a significant inter-
action, showing the same pattern as those in Study 1 and 2b, 
F(1, 167) = 7.18, p < .01. In the distraction condition, we 
found a significant effect of the closeness manipulation, 
F(1, 165) = 12.89, p < .01. Those in the close condition 
(M = 5.14, SD = 1.46) allocated more coins to the receiver 
than those in the distant condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.85). In 
the no distraction condition, there was no effect of closeness 
(M
close
 = 4.00, SD = 1.83, M
distant
 = 4.02, SD = 1.66; F < 1). 
Those in the close condition allocated significantly fewer 
coins to the receiver when they had the chance to deliberate 
their decision than when they were distracted, F(1, 165) = 
9.26, p < .01. We found no effect of distraction on partici-
pants in the distant condition, F < 1.
Discussion
This study provides additional evidence for our hypothesis 
that perceived interpersonal closeness mediates the auto-
matic expression of SVO on behavior in interdependence 
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situations, by establishing the causal role played by close-
ness perceptions. Manipulating interpersonal closeness influ-
enced allocation decisions in a DG when decisions were 
based on automatic judgments. Those who perceived the 
other as closer allocated more resources to the receiver. 
When participants had the chance to deliberate, the effect of 
the closeness manipulation disappeared, as did the effect of 
SVO in Studies 1 and 2b. This means that not only internal-
ized long-term values (e.g., SVO) but also momentarily 
manipulated perceptions of the interaction partners can 
influence behavior automatically.
General Discussion
We tested the hypothesis that SVO, as a measure of chroni-
cally accessible goals to pursue the interest of others or the 
self, is expressed automatically in behavior. A first study 
suggested that this is indeed the case. In a DG, when deci-
sions were made automatically, prosocials allocated more 
resources to the receiver than did proselfs. When cognitive 
resources were not taxed, prosocials reduced their generos-
ity to the level of proselfs, whose behavior did not change. 
We replicated these results in Study 2b. In addition, we 
hypothesized that perceived interpersonal closeness is a 
mediator for the automatic expression of SVO. In Study 2a 
we established that there is a relationship between both. 
Prosocials perceive random other people to be closer to them 
than proselfs. In Study 2b we confirmed that the automatic 
expression of SVO on allocation decisions is mediated by 
the perceived interpersonal closeness of the interaction part-
ner. In Study 3 we further corroborated the causal role of 
closeness by manipulating it and replicating the pattern of 
results of Studies 1 and 2b. To our knowledge, these are the 
first studies to establish the relationship between SVO and 
interpersonal closeness and its mediating role in determining 
prosocial behavior.
Generalization to Other 
Social Dilemma Situations
Our data suggest that people’s other-regarding or self-
regarding values, as measured by SVO, are expressed auto-
matically in decisions in the DG. One could wonder whether 
our findings would generalize to real-life situations. We 
would argue that they would, for several reasons. First, prior 
research has provided ample empirical evidence showing 
that SVO predicts cooperative choices in many life domains 
(Gärling et al., 2003; McClintock & Allison, 1989; Nauta 
et al., 2002; Van Lange, Agnew, et al., 1997). Second, it has 
been argued that in most daily situations a large number of 
stimuli compete for our limited cognitive resources, and 
behavior is therefore often executed rather automatically 
(e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). 
In addition, many social dilemma situations require very 
quick decisions, which promotes automatic decision making. 
The decision whether to stop and talk to a street campaigner 
who, you know, will ask for a charity donation and the deci-
sion to comply with a request for a favor from a colleague 
are usually made in a split second, precluding an extensive 
reasoning process. Third, the transparent nature of gains and 
losses in the DG might artificially stimulate contemplation 
of the decision at hand. In real-life situations, payoff struc-
tures might be less transparent, discouraging an analysis in 
terms of costs and benefits. For these reasons we think that 
SVO, as a measure of cooperative values, does influence our 
behavior in a considerable number of real-life situations. 
This does not mean that our findings in the DG generalize to 
every context. Emphasizing three characteristics of the DG 
may help to conjecture in which situations our model would 
hold. First, in the DG, there is no commonly agreed on stan-
dard for what would constitute fair behavior. Although we 
would suggest that the same is true for many real-life situa-
tions, our model might not fit situations in which such fair-
ness standards are available. If a group of friends habitually 
splits the bill after an evening out, it is clear what each per-
son’s fair contribution would be. In such a situation, people 
are likely to override dispositional tendencies and follow the 
group norm (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). Second, in the 
DG, the personal material benefit of allocating money to the 
receiver is zero. Pursuing the interest of others does not yield 
personal gains. In situations of interdependence, like in an 
ultimatum game or prisoner’s dilemma game, an individu-
al’s outcomes are dependent on what other players do. In 
those games, or the real-life situations that resemble them, it 
may be in a person’s self-interest to behave cooperatively 
for strategic reasons. The cooperative act may set off recip-
rocal acts that benefit both individuals. In such a situation, 
our model would not hold. Instead, we would predict cogni-
tive elaboration to lead to higher levels of cooperative 
behavior. Helping my neighbor jump-start his car might 
ensure a reciprocal act when my own battery is dead. Third, 
we assumed that social norms exist that prescribe selfish 
behavior. When we asked our participants how many coins 
they expected other dictators to allocate to the receiver, on 
average their answer was 3.78 out of 11 coins. Giving 34% 
of one’s endowment to an unknown other can hardly be 
called strict selfishness. It is a smaller amount, however, 
than what prosocials and those who feel close to the receiver 
spontaneously decided to give. Therefore, we can expect 
that in a situation where social norms or expectations exist 
that most people do behave in the interest of others, contem-
plating one’s decision might actually increase, and not 
decrease, other-regarding behavior. In such situations where 
the group norm refers to high levels of cooperative behavior, 
our model would not hold.
In short, we suggest that our model may be valid for the 
many daily life contexts that de facto share these characteris-
tics with the DG: the absence of an objective indicator of 
appropriate behavior, a negligible personal material benefit 
of cooperation, and the absence of a social norm prescribing 
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prosocial behavior. Of course, there are contexts in which 
not all these features are present. Previous research has docu-
mented situations in which other dual process models involv-
ing SVO are applied.
Other Dual Process Models 
of Other-Regarding Behavior
For example, Roch et al. (2000) found that in resource games, 
participants automatically anchor on their fair share, and when 
they contemplate their decisions, they become more selfish. 
Unfortunately the data do not allow for a comparison of the 
size of this selfish adjustment by prosocials and proselfs, 
although proselfs expressed more motivated thought toward 
deviating from their fair share. As we indicated before, the 
“fair share” constitutes a clear group norm. When it is clear 
what that fair share is, behavior will likely match it, for both 
prosocials and proselfs. In a resource game, one’s fair share 
is obvious: the size of the resource divided by the number of 
players. There is also a strong group norm to take not more 
from the shared resource than the fair share. This suggests 
that the salience and transparency of the cooperative norm 
will determine whether individual chronic values will be 
expressed under cognitive load.
Another pattern is found in van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, 
and Ybema (2006). In their studies, participants indicated 
how satisfying a given, personally advantageous, resource 
distribution was. They report that people judge advantageous 
inequity to be more satisfying when judgments are made 
automatically than when they are based on a thinking pro-
cess. They concluded that evaluating an advantageous out-
come positively is automatic, whereas taking fairness concerns 
into account requires a reasoning process. Several differ-
ences between the decision situations in van den Bos et al. 
and ours may be responsible for the alternative decision-
making process. A very important difference is that in the DG, 
participants have to make active decisions regarding resource 
allocations, whereas in van den Bos et al.’s procedure, par-
ticipants had to judge satisfaction with given distributions. 
These two judgments are likely to activate different mental 
concepts and different types of evaluations. Participants in 
our studies had to take responsibility for the resource alloca-
tion they decided on, whereas the participants in the van den 
Bos study had no power over the decision. If one has no 
power over a decision, one cannot be held accountable for a 
certain resource allocation, not by others nor by the self. In 
this case, one’s self-perception “as a fair person” is not threat-
ened when the allocation is unfair. We agree with van den 
Bos et al. that future research should further specify models 
related to people’s implicit preferences and the effect of a 
reasoning process. It should search for the nature of the mod-
erators and characteristics of a context that determine which 
model predicts behavior in a certain social dilemma situation 
better. We have indicated the three characteristics that are 
likely to be essential for our model to apply.
Limitations and Future Research
Our data suggest that when people’s automatic responses are 
prosocial, contemplating a decision in a social dilemma situ-
ation is likely to promote more self-interested behavior. It is 
not clear, however, what exactly happens during the contem-
plation process and why it leads to more selfish choices. 
Possibly, what takes place is motivated reasoning. When dic-
tators have sufficient cognitive resources to deliberate their 
decisions, they may make a case for pursuing self-serving 
temptations without damaging their self-concept as a fair 
individual, which overrides the effects of closeness and, by 
extension, SVO. Alternatively, it is possible that dictators, 
when deliberating their choice, do not find a justification to 
allocate a substantial amount to the receiver. Perhaps their 
adherence to the norm of self-interest prevents prosocials 
from following their first inclination. If this is true, then 
prosocials might decide to be more generous if a cue is 
available that would justify them to do so (Holmes, Miller, 
& Lerner, 2002). Third, cognitive activity may be devoted to 
forming expectations of what others would do in a similar 
situation. Subsequently, they match those expectations. 
When choices are made spontaneously, on the other hand, 
prosocials do not take these expectations into account (or, 
more exactly, do not form such expectations) and base their 
decisions on their SVO. As a result, they allocate a larger amount 
to the receiver. In fact, several of these accounts could be 
valid and operate in parallel. Another limitation was the fact 
that the size of the endowment that dictators divided was 
rather small in our studies. Future research should verify 
whether the current model holds over a range of endow-
ment sizes.
Considering the common assumption that many of the 
judgments and decisions we make are automatic (e.g., Bargh 
& Chartrand, 1999), and our finding that other-regarding 
goals may be expressed automatically, from a public policy 
perspective it might be interesting to study how the promo-
tion of other values can lead to them being automatically 
expressed in behavior. Many individuals struggle to pursue 
long-term self-interested goals, such as being fit and healthy, 
or other-regarding goals, such as protecting the environment 
or making ethical decisions, in the presence of tempting 
alternatives (such as fatty food or cheap but polluting con-
sumer products). If adopted values over time get to be 
expressed automatically (just like other-regarding prefer-
ences for prosocials), it may become much easier for people 
to pursue their long-term goals, as it would no longer be nec-
essary to perform effortful control strategies to do so. In that 
case, the harmful alternatives would simply not be consid-
ered or would be considered unattractive. If the expression of 
long-term goals remains the task of our reasoning system, 
we are condemned to a struggle of resisting temptations 
through self-control. It is likely, however, that both systems 
are involved. Adopting a new value might be like learning to 
drive a car. Initially, it is under the control of our reasoning 
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system, but after training the execution migrates to the auto-
matic system (Dewitte, Bruyneel, & Geyskens, 2009). Future 
research might help us understand these issues and make 
suggestions on how to pursue long-term goals successfully.
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Notes
1. In the remainder of the article, we use the formulation “automatic 
decisions” to refer to “decisions based on automatic responses.”
2. We used this procedure instead of the mediation test proposed 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) because it allows us to test the 
predicted mediated moderation directly.
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